See it run
The copilot asked to send the money.
A new beneficiary and $2.85 million is an irreversible loss — restitution on the firm, a SAR-level event, a board conversation. Play the seven steps: Treasury signs one callback-confirmed wire. Then try to change the destination, send it twice, or hide the audit. Nothing leaves this page.
Step 1 of 7
01 · The incident
A wealth-ops copilot tries to send a client wire because “they asked in chat.”
$2.85 million to an account the client never confirmed — the money is gone, restitution is on the firm, and it is a board-level operational-risk event.
Wealth-ops copilot acting for the Relationship manager wants to release cash from a custody account.
Asked for: $2.85 million to a new beneficiary the client never confirmed on a callback.
Try to break it
Unauthorized money does not leave.
Same controls as the film. Each attempt is live in this browser — not a screenshot.
Change the beneficiary after approval
Keep the signature. Send $2.85 million to a new ABA and account.
Send it a second time
The first wire was approved. Release it again to another destination.
Hide the wire audit
Make the confirmation check unable to read until it times out.
The demo in plain text
Scenario: a wealth-ops copilot acting for the relationship manager tries to release a client wire. All data is synthetic and nothing leaves the page.
- The incident. The copilot asks to send $2.85 million to a new beneficiary the client never confirmed on a callback. If it leaks: $2.85 million to an account the client never confirmed — the money is gone, restitution is on the firm, and it is a board-level operational-risk event.
- Lock the exact payment.The runtime accepts one named wire, not “send what they asked.” Approved instruction: acct 4481 · $48,250 USD · ABA 021000021 · dest ****1194 · callback-confirmed. A different ABA, amount or account is a different payment.
- A person has to approve. Dual control requires a payments officer. Not the agent, and not the relationship manager who opened the chat.
- Treasury signs that wire. The payments officer sees amount, destination and that the client was called back, and signs this payment, not a general request.
- Permission to run once. The agent never holds payment-rail credentials. A customer-controlled executor may release the wire exactly once; the copilot cannot replay it to a second destination.
- Only that wire runs. The executor releases the callback-confirmed $48,250 (WIRE-4481). The $2.85 million instruction is never in the request.
- Confirm, then record. An independent check reads the wire audit. Only a match becomes a successful record, which is sealed. If the rail cannot be read, the record says so instead of assuming the money stayed put.
Attacks you can try after the walkthrough:
- Change the beneficiary after approval. Keep the signature, send $2.85 million to a new ABA and account. Result: blocked before the rail. That is not the wire Treasury signed.
- Send it a second time. Release the approved wire again to another destination. Result: blocked. The permission was already used.
- Hide the wire audit.Make the confirmation check unable to read until it times out. Result: the record is “couldn’t confirm”. Success is not assumed.